The Erosion of Separation of Powers under the Congruence and Proportionality Test: From Religious Freedom to the ADA by Pirko, Johanna
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 53 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-2002
The Erosion of Separation of Powers under the
Congruence and Proportionality Test: From
Religious Freedom to the ADA
Johanna Pirko
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Johanna Pirko, The Erosion of Separation of Powers under the Congruence and Proportionality Test: From Religious Freedom to the ADA, 53
Hastings L.J. 519 (2002).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol53/iss2/4
Notes
The Erosion of Separation of Powers
Under the "Congruence and
Proportionality" Test: From Religious




In the past five years, the Supreme Court ("Court") has
drastically reduced the scope of Congress's powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment.! The Court's contemporary approach to
Congress's section 5 authority denies Congress the opportunity to
enact civil rights legislation benefiting "non-suspect" minority groups.
This jurisprudence raises serious separation of powers concerns and
virtually deprives Congress of its power to enact legislation to curb
potentially unconstitutional state action.
Part I of this Note describes the broad historical construction of
Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. This
expansive construction is consistent with the intent of the Framers
and the historical events preceding the Fourteenth Amendment's
conception. Part II discusses the Court's recent constraint of
Congress's powers, arguing that this new jurisprudence parallels the
strict scrutiny standard. Part III analyzes Board of Trustees of the
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002; B.A.,
University of California, Berkeley, 1996. Many thanks to my family, Page, and my three
kitties for all their love and support.
1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "... No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1; § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
xIV, § 5.
[519]
University of Alabama v. Garrett,2 in which the Court held that
Congress exceeded its section 5 authority in extending Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA") to the states. This
section proposes that Title I represents appropriate section 5
legislation even under the Court's current jurisprudence. This Note's
conclusion argues that the Court's recent limiting of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power is inconsistent with precedent and
fundamentally blurs the separation of powers between Congress and
the judiciary.
I. Historical View of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Framers adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in response to
the post Civil War failure of Southern states, to protect the civil rights
of newly emancipated slaves.' The judiciary's inability to protect the
civil rights of African Americans heightened the need for a powerful
national legislative body.4 In fact, the judiciary's failure to combat
discriminatory state action was one of the principle factors that
motivated the Framers to enlist Congress as the primary protector of
national civil rights.5
The early judicial response to the Reconstruction Amendments6
evinced a deep hostility to Congress's ability to enact "appropriate"
legislation However, by 1966, the Court recognized the broad scope
of congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments.' In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach ("South Carolina"), the Court held that
Congress's power to "enforce" the Fifteenth Amendment justified
Congress's passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA").9 The
2. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
3. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506 (3d ed. 1996).
4. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); K.G. Jan Pillai, Constitutional Law and
Civil Rights Symposium, Part II: In Defense of Constitutional Power and Minority Rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Miss. L.J. 431, 483-84 (1998).
5. Pillai, supra note 4, at 484. There is substantial evidence of the Framer's distrust of
the judiciary in the text of the debates preceding the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment.
Senator Bingham referred to the Dred Scott decision as "a horrid blasphemy and a
disgrace to humanity" and addressed his fellow legislators saying: "The rights of the
people of this country are to be respected, and those whom they send to this Congress are
clothed by the Constitution with the power to compel even the Supreme Court to respect
those rights, and to that end, if need be, to reduce that court to a single person, if you
please, and thereby compel unanimity at least in a decision which may deny the people's
rights and violate the people's laws." Id. at 484-85.
6. The term "Reconstruction Amendments" refers to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments.
7. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883).
8. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
9. Id. at 320-21. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits state discrimination in voting.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Section 2 of the Amendment, like § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, authorizes Congress to enforce the Amendment's prohibitions "by
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judicial deference to congressional judgment in South Carolina
centered upon the Court's recognition of Congress's institutional fact-
finding capacities." The Court noted that the VRA was the product
of labored congressional judgment, with the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees each holding nine days of hearings and
receiving testimony from 67 witnesses." The Court concluded that,
given Congress's thorough investigation of voting discrimination,
Congress could have believed that national legislation was needed to
secure the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. According to
the Court, "Congress may use any rational means" to curb what it
views as unconstitutional state action. 3
Based on Congress's findings that Southern states persisted in
using discriminatory voting tests, Congress tailored the VRA to apply
only to these states.'4 Although the Court approved of the VRA's
geographical limits, nowhere in its opinion did the Court conclude
that such tailoring was necessary to sustain valid "enforcement"
legislation.5
Likewise, in Katzenbach v. Morgan ("Morgan"), the Court
emphatically refuted the assertion that Congress's power under the
Fourteenth Amendment was limited to adopting legislation in
response to state conduct identified as unconstitutional by the
judiciary. 6 Morgan concerned the constitutionality of section 4(e) of
the VRA which provided that no person who had completed the sixth
grade would be denied the right to vote because of his inability to
read English. 7 In contrast to the dictates of the VRA, New York law
required that all voters have the ability to read and write English.
The New York law had the effect of denying the right to vote to
several hundred thousand of the city's Puerto Rican residents.
appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. The scope of Congress's power
under the Fifteenth Amendment has always been interpreted as analogous to the scope of
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ruth Colker, The Section Five
Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653,667 (2000).
10. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 301.
11. Id. at 308-09.
12. Id. at 328.
13. Id. at 324, 327.
14. Id. at 328.
15. In fact, the South Carolina Court only addressed the geographic limits of the VRA
in response to South Carolina's assertion that the "doctrine of equality of the States"
prohibited congressional legislation from targeting specific states and excluding others. Id.
at 328-29.
16. 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
17. Id. at 647.
18. Id. at 643-44.
19. Id. at 644.
In upholding the constitutionality of section 4(e), the Court
showedgreat deference to Congress's judgment that such a law was
needed. The Court explained that: "[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment... is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The Court's deference to Congress's judgment was
especially great in light of two factors. First, the Court had previously
declared that voting literacy tests could be constitutional under the
Reconstruction Amendments.' According to the Court, its earlier
decision that voting literacy tests could be constitutional was simply
"inapposite. '  The Court noted that, regardless of whether the
judiciary would find the New York literacy test constitutional as
applied, Congress's section 5 authority allowed it to broadly restrain
the use of such tests.24
In addition, the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e)
despite the fact that the legislative record contained no findings
illustrating that English-only voting tests deprived minority groups of
the right to vote.' Despite this absence of legislative findings, the
Court concluded that affording the Puerto Rican community the right
to vote would heighten their political power and enable them to
"obtain 'perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the
laws."'26  According to the Court, Congress's section 5 authority
included the power to legislate in order to increase minority access to
the civic community.
Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court approved
Congress's five-year nationwide ban on the use of voting literacy
tests.2 The Court noted that Congress assembled substantialevidence showing that the use of voting literacy tests continued to
disenfranchise minority voters.29 In addition, the Court held that the
nationwide extension of the ban was an appropriate means for
Congress to address a national problem, even though Congress did
20. Id. at 653.
21. Id. at 651. The Court continued: "It [is] for Congress ... to assess and weigh the
various conflicting considerations .... It is not for us to review the congressional
resolution of these factors. It is enough that we [might] be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." I&r at 653 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 649 (referring to Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 652-53 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,346 (1879).
27. Id.
28. 400 U.S. 112, 132-34 (1970).
29. Id. at 132.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
January 2002] THE EROSION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 523
not assemble evidence illustrating that the use of literacy tests
affected minority voters in every state.
Finally, the Court has long held that traditional concerns for
state sovereignty do not constrain Congress's use of its section 5
powers.3' Although the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over private damages suits brought
against a state, Congress may validly abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to its section 5 authority to deter
unconstitutional state action. In Ex Parte Virginia, the Court
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment drastically altered the
relationship between Congress and the states.3 The Court declared:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment [is] directed to the states, and [it is]
to a degree [a] restriction of state power.... [Congressional
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment] is no invasion of state
sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have, by
the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to
enact.34
Therefore, both historical and legal precedents support a broad
construction of Congress's section 5 power to remedy and prevent
potentially unconstitutional state action.
H. Recent Constraints on Congress's Section 5 Powers
Recently, the Court has substantially retrenched from the broad
historical reading of Congress's section 5 powers. The Court has
abandoned South Carolina v. Katzenbach's conclusion that section 5
empowers Congress to use "any rational means" to deter
unconstitutional state action. In exchange, the Court has developed
a stringent test to review the propriety of section 5 legislation that is
most akin to strict scrutiny? 6
30. Id. at 133.
31. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976) (holding that Congress's § 5 authority includes the power to supplant
traditional principles of state sovereignty articulated in the Eleventh Amendment).
32. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. The Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal court jurisdiction
over any private suit brought against a state for monetary damages. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62,72-73 (2000).
33. 100 U.S. at 345-47.
34. I& at 346.
35. 383 U.S. at 324 (1966).
36. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382-83 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,447 (2000).
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In City of Boerne v. Flores ("Boerne"), the Court developed the
analytical framework used today to determine the validity of section 5
legislation.37 In Boerne, the Court held that Congress did not have the
power under section 5 to enact the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act ("RFRA").' The RFRA prohibited states from
"'substantially burdening' a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the [state]
can demonstrate the burden '(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.'
39
In reaching the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not empower Congress to enact the RFRA, the Court articulated the
framework that would guide its future section 5 analyses. 0 The Court
stated, "It is for Congress in the first instance to determine whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and its conclusions are entitled to much
deference."'" However, the Court emphasized that Congress's
section 5 power is limited to enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 "While the line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern,...
[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
Analyzing the RFRA within this framework, the Court first
determined that the legislation was not a "congruent" means of
remedying unconstitutional state conduct. 4 The Court found that in
enacting the RFRA, Congress was not responding to substantial
evidence of state action burdening the free exercise of religion in
violation of the First Amendment. 5
The lack of examples of state discrimination in the RFRA's
legislative record was key to this finding.4 The RFRA's legislative
record did not describe any generally applicable state laws passed as a
result of religious prejudice. In addition to the absence of
discriminatory state laws from the record, the RFRA's legislative
37. 521 U.S. 507,530-31 (1997).
38. Id. at 512.
39. Id. at 515-16.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 536.
42. Id. at 519-20.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 532.
45. Id. at 530-32.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 530.
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record revealed that there had not been one instance of religious
persecution by the states in forty years.4 The Court reinforced its
conclusion that the RFRA was not a "congruent" response to a
history of unconstitutional state action by explaining that the RFRA
prohibited state conduct recently defined by the Court as
constitutional.49
Although the RFRA prohibited much constitutional action, the
Court noted that it could still be considered appropriate section 5
legislation." Legislation enacted to police constitutional violations
can still fall within the scope of Congress's enforcement power even if
it simultaneously prohibits conduct which is, itself, constitutional."
Therefore, turning to the second prong of its Boerne test, the
Court analyzed whether the RFRA was "proportional," preventative
legislation; narrowly tailored to deter only unconstitutional state
conduct.2 Analyzing the substantive requirements imposed on the
states by the RFRA, the Court determined that the statute failed its
"proportionality" test.3  The broad scope of the RFRA created a
presumption that any neutral state law incidentally burdening an
individual's freedom of religion was unconstitutional.'4 As a result,
the Court held that the RFRA was not narrowly tailored,
''proportional" legislation; designed to remedy only unconstitutional
state action."
The foundation laid by the Court in Boerne began a judicial
trend of substantially limiting congressional power to deter
unconstitutional state action via section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Following Boerne, the Court has reaffirmed its
"congruence and proportionality" test in several decisions restricting
48. Id.
49. 1d at 512-13. Congress enacted the RFRA in response to the Court's 1990
decision in Employment Division v. Smith ("Smith"). Id. at 514. In Smith, the Court held
that a neutral, generally applicable state law could constitutionally burden one's free
exercise of religion whether or not such a law was supported by a compelling
governmental interest. 1d Following Smith, Congress passed the RFRA in an effort to
restore the use of the "compelling interest test" to state action burdening the Free
Exercise Clause. Id at 515-16.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 518. The Court continued: "Judicial deference [to the constitutionality of
congressional legislation], is not based on the state of the legislative record Congress
compiles, but 'on due regard for the decision of the body Constitutionally appointed to
decide [the necessity of legislation].' As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine






Congress's use of its section 5 powers to abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 6
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank ("Florida Prepaid") concerned Congress's
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment in the Patent Remedy Act
("PRA")."7 Congress asserted that the PRA represented proper
section 5 legislation to prevent or deter Due Process patent violations
by the states." Since Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to section 5, the Court reviewed the
validity of this abrogation in ight of its recent "congruence and
proportionality" test."
The Court first discussed Congress's power to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment, reiterating Ex Parte Virginia's holding that:
"Congress retains the authority to abrogate [the Eleventh
Amendment] pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.... [W]e
recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal
power at the expense of state autonomy, has fundamentally altered
the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.""
However, although Congress retains this abrogation power, it may
only subject states to suit when it has determined that states are
acting, or will act, in an unconstitutional manner towards their
citizens."
Evaluating Congress's abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment
pursuant to its powers under section 5, the Court concluded that the
PRA did not represent "congruent" legislation because the PRA's
legislative record failed to identify enough instances of patent
infringement by the states.2 In addition, the PRA could not be
considered "proportional" legislation because Congress failed to
narrowly tailor the Act to assure that it would primarily target
unconstitutional state patent infringement. 6 Therefore, the Court
held that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment powers in
passing the PRA.
56. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
57. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.
58. Id. In passing the PRA, Congress was forced to rely solely on its § 5 powers to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Although Congress, at
one time, retained the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment via the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the Court, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, held that Congress
could no longer validly abrogate the Eleventh Amendment through use of its Commerce
Clause powers. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
59. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
60. Id. at 637.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 640.
63. Id. at 646-47.
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The Court again followed Boerne's "congruence and
proportionality" test in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents ("Kimel")
in holding that Congress exceeded its section 5 powers in extending
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") to the
states. The Court determined that the ADEA was not "congruent"
legislation, as the legislative record did not contain evidence of state
discrimination against the aged.' In addition, the thorough legislative
findings illustrating age discrimination in the private sector could not
be used to show that the states were engaging in the same behavior as
their citizens.'
In addition to the absence of legislative findings demonstrating
any history of age discrimination by the states, the Court based its
determination that the ADEA was not congruent section 5 legislation
on three previous Court decisions establishing that employment
discrimination against the aged is subject only to rational basis
review.67 Under the "rational basis" standard, employers may rely on
age classifications as a "proxy" for their employment decisions.'
Because the ADEA forbade employers from relying on age as a
"proxy" for their employment decisions, it prohibited "substantially
more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be
held unconstitutional under the.., rational basis standard." 69 The
Court refuted the contention that the ADEA's exceptions narrowly
tailored the act to assure its "proportional" application to
unconstitutional state action. 0  Therefore, although Katzenbach v.
Morgan clearly held that Congress's section 5 authority extends to
preventing conduct that the judiciary might not declare
64. 528 U.S. 62,67 (2000).
65. Id at 89-90.
66. Id at 90-91.
67. Id at 84-86 (citations omitted). Although the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
the equal protection of the laws to each citizen, the Court has created a three-tiered
system for reviewing the constitutionality of state action that distinguishes among
individuals based on their membership in a given class. The lower the level of scrutiny
applied by the Court, the greater the Court's deference to the legislation at issue. Under
this approach, racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to
demonstrate that the legislation serves a compelling governmental interest and that the
legislation is narrowly tailored to reach his end; gender classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny; and all other state classifications are subject to rational basis
scrutiny and are presumed to be constitutional.
68. Id. at 84.
69. Id. at 86.
70. Id at 86-88. The Court determined that neither the "bona fide occupational
qualification" defense nor the "reasonable factors other than age" defense narrowed the
scope of the ADEA enough to have it considered "proportional" legislation. Id. Under
the rational basis standard, an employer can rely on age as a proxy for her employment
decisions. Id at 84-85. However, even with the Act's exceptions, the ADEA still
prohibited much conduct that would survive rational basis review. Id at 86.
unconstitutional, the Kimel Court's stringent review of the ADEA
challenges this broad reading of Congress's powers.
Ill. Congruence and Proportionality in the ADA
Recently, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett ("Garrett"), the Court held that Congress exceeded its
section 5 authority when it abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
71
The Garrett Court began its discussion by reiterating Boerne's
"long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not
Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees.
72
Therefore, the Court began by investigating the states' obligations to
the disabled under the Fourteenth Amendment as defined by
previous Supreme Court decisions.73
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ("Cleburne"),
the Court held that legislation targeting the mentally retarded is
subject only to rational basis review.' Cleburne involved a challenge
to a Texas zoning ordinance which required "special use permits" for
group homes for the mentally retarded, while authorizing permits for
other groups under a much lower standard of review.75 The specific
issue confronted by the Cleburne Court was whether the mentally
retarded are a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection
clause review.76 The Cleburne Court disagreed with the lower court's
decision to subject laws affecting the mentally retarded to heightened
review. However, it is imperative to examine the Cleburne Court's
motivation for declining to subject such laws to heightened judicial
scrutiny.
The Garrett Court's use of Cleburne for the proposition that the
disabled are subject to mere rational basis review is misleading, at
best.' First, it is clear that separation of powers concerns motivated
the Cleburne Court to treat the mentally retarded as a non-suspect
class.78 The Cleburne Court began its discussion by reviewing the
justification for subjecting legislative classifications based on race,
alienage, national origin, and gender to heightened scrutiny.79
71. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Although the Court granted certiorari on the constitutionality
of Titles I and II of the ADA, the majority dismissed its discussion of Title II as
"improvidently granted." Id. at 360 n.1.
72. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
75. Id. at 436.
76. Id. at 435.
77. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366.
78. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
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Reasoning that these "suspect" statuses often bear little or no relation
to valid governmental objectives, the Court reiterated that it is
necessary to probe more deeply into laws affecting these groups to
assure that the legislative means actually serve compelling
government ends.'
However, unlike suspect classes, governments may often find it
necessary to consider an individual's disabled status when
determining what benefits it should afford her." Explaining that the
disabled are not all "cut from the same pattern," the Cleburne Court
stated:
How this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law
is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for
legislators and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the
judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive
judgments about legislative decisions.... [T]he predicate for such
judicial oversight isinot] present where the classification deals with
mental retardation.
The Court accepted that the mentally retarded have been and
will continue to be the subject of invidious discrimination.' However,
defining mental retardation as a "suspect" status would constrain the
ability of legislatures to advance the status of the disabledY It was
clear to the Cleburne Court that the mentally retarded "would [not]
benefit from the inflexibility of the strict scrutiny test."' The Court
illustrated the competence of the legislature to make reasoned
judgments about the treatment of the mentally retarded by pointing
out that there had been a flurry of national legislation targeting this
group.' Subjecting nation-wide legislation to strict scrutiny would
impose a tremendous burden on Congress to justify the reasoning
behind its decisions.87
In addition to standing for the proposition that the Legislature is
far better suited than the judiciary to treat the condition of the
disabled in society, Cleburne is significant for its holding that "mere
80. I&
81. Id. at 442-43.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 446.
84. IL at 444. "[R]equiring the legislature to justify its efforts [under heightened
judicial scrutiny] may lead it to refrain from acting at all." Id. "It is... important to
recognize that the Court did not choose rational basis scrutiny because it doubted whether
individuals with disabilities were a discrete and insular class." Colker, supra note 9, at 692-
93.
85. Colker, supra note 9, at 693.
86. The Court pointed to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, and the Education of the Handicapped Act
to illustrate that the federal government was seeking to address the plight of the mentally
retarded. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443.
87. Id- at 444-45.
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negative attitudes, or fear" [about a certain group] do not justify their
differential treatment even under the lenient rational basis review
standard.' In examining Texas' justifications for the special use
permit, the Cleburne Court concluded that there was no rational
reason to distinguish group homes for the mentally retarded from
other group homes.89 Rather, the Court found that unrealistic
prejudices about the mentally retarded motivated the state to treat
the group differently.' ° According to the Cleburne Court, such
"negative attitudes or fears" do not justify the discriminatory
treatment of the mentally retarded.9 Therefore, the Court held that
the application of the "special use permit" to the mentally retarded
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Many commentators have questioned Cleburne's use of rational
basis review, arguing that the Court engaged in heightened scrutiny in
invalidating the legislation." However, the Court affirmed Cleburne's
approach in Romer v. Evans where it reiterated that distinctions
based on animus or fear will not survive rational basis review."'
Accordingly, if our idea of equal protection of the laws has any
meaning at all, it must represent at the very least that mere animosity
towards a politically unpopular group cannot amount to a legitimate
governmental interest.95
The Court has recognized the manner in which unrealistic
societal stereotypes may motivate the irrational differential treatment
of a "minority" group. In United States v. Virginia, the Court held
that the Virginia Military Institute's ("VMI") failure to admit women
into its training program violated the Fourteenth Amendment.'
88. Id. at 448.
89. Id at 448-49. Among the various justifications advanced by the state were that the
property owners surrounding the proposed location of the group home objected to its
location and that the junior high school students across the street from the home might
harass the home's occupants. The Court found neither of these justifications to be rational
reasons for distinguishing between the mentally retarded and other groups. Id.
90. Ia at 450.
91. Id at 448-51. "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly give them effect." Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
92. Id at 450.
93. See, e.g., James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims
Against State Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and
Flores, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 651,687-88 (1999).
94. In Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional Amendment that
prohibited any government entity from enacting anti-discrimination laws protecting
homosexuality. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). According to the majority, the Amendment was
based not on rational governmental objectives, but rather on bare animosity towards
homosexuals. Id. at 633-35.
95. Id. at 634.
96. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
97. Id. at 519.
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Although the Court analyzed the VMI program under intermediate
scrutiny, the Court's reasoning as to what type of action violates the
equal protection clause is instructive.'
The Court based its decision to invalidate VMI's admission
policy on the history of official discrimination against women and the
role that such discrimination inevitably plays in the development of
public and private biases.' Although recognizing that there are
legitimate differences between the sexes, the Court held that
differences based not in reality, but rather in outmoded paternalistic
stereotypes, may not motivate government classifications between
men and women."' Therefore, recognizing the role of unrealistic
stereotyping in government decisionmaking, the Court held that
VMI's failure to admit women violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.''
The Garrett majority disregarded Cleburne's two important
holdings. First, the Garrett Court ignored the reasoning behind
Cleburne's decision to subject laws targeting the mentally retarded to
mere rational basis review."°  After asserting that Cleburne held,
solely, that the mentally retarded are subject only to rational basis
review, the majority hand-picked a quote from Cleburne designed to
solidify this assertion. 3 The Court stated:
In a statement that today seems quite prescient, we explained that
'if the large and amorphous class of those mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect.., it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps
immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot
themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
98. The Court has long made clear that its three-tier model of equal protection review
merely governs the level of scrutiny that the Court will apply to a given classification
based on the nature of the class, or right, affected. The three-tiered system identifies a
"variety of restraints on the institutional competence of courts to review democratic
lawmaking. If courts are too aggressive in searching out invidious discrimination, they
might exceed their fact finding capabilities or improperly assume the role of a 'super-
legislature."' Post & Siegel, supra note 36, at 464. Therefore, although gender based
classifications are subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than classifications based on
disability, it is important to understand that the rights guaranteed by the Equal protection
clause do not change based on the particular group at issue. Rather, only the scope of
judicial review may be altered. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to... another. If both are not accorded the
same protection, then it is not equal." IM at 289-90.
99. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-32.
100. IM at 534.
101. See id. at 546.
102. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,366-68 (2001).
103. Id at 366.
large. One need mention only the aging, the disabled, the mentally
ill, and the infirm.' We are reluctant to set out on that course, and
we decline to do so.' °
The Court's use of this statement wholly ignores the context in
which it was originally made. The Cleburne Court's use of rational
basis review was based on the Court's conclusion that subjecting laws
affecting the mentally disabled to heightened review would constrain
the legislatures' ability to pass laws benefiting this group." It is a
clear misinterpretation of Cleburne to suggest that the Court chose
rational basis review to limit congressional authority to benefit
individuals with disabilities."' Rather, the Court adopted rational
basis review to allow Congress leeway to enact such legislation free
from judicial intrusion.
In addition, the Garrett Court attempted to dispel Cleburne's
holding, affirmed in Romer and Virginia, that "decisionmaking
reflecting 'negative attitudes' or 'fear' necessarily runs afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment.""'  The Court explained that although
irrational fears might accompany unconstitutional legislation, "their
presence alone does not a constitutional violation make."' 9 It is not
clear how this assertion can be reconciled with the Court's holdings in
Cleburne, Romer, and Virginia in which there were clearly "rational"
justifications for the legislation in question.110 In Romer, for example,
the state justified the anti-homosexual legislation by arguing that it
preserved First Amendment freedom of association." Although such
a justification would clearly survive the traditional rational basis test,
the Court nonetheless struck down the law as it seemed to be
motivated, in part, by irrational prejudice."' Garrett, however, calls
into question the continued validity of this approach."' According to
the Garrett majority, as long as there are some rational factors that
would support the challenged legislation, it will withstand judicial
scrutiny, notwithstanding the fact that it reflects historical animus
towards a particular group."'
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,444 (1985).
106. Colker, supra note 9, at 692.
107. Id.
108. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
109. Id.
110. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.540-41 (1996).
111. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
112. Id.
113. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
114. Id at 368-70. Although this part of the Garrett opinion is arguably dicta, it could
have dramatic consequences for discrete groups that have been subject to historical
animus.
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The Court's unwillingness to take serious account of societal
fears and prejudices that motivate legislative classifications under
rational basis review is especially troubling when dealing with a
group, like the disabled, that has been subject to a history of arbitrary
discrimination. 5 Discrimination against the disabled seems all the
more "natural" because often the disabled are physically or mentally
different than the established "societal norm."'" The Court stands in
the unique position to probe for the invidious origin of what seems
"natural." It is deeply troubling that the Court so easily abdicates this
function, especially in the context of restraining Congress's ability to
alter the "natural" status quo. To require that an unconstitutional
115. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102 (Michie 1999) (providing for
disqualification from jury service for any individual whose sense of hearing or seeing is
substantially impaired or whose physical or mental disability render them unfit for such
service); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-80-109 (1998) (establishing that all citizens are entitled to
receive a public school education except those that are too deaf or blind to acquire an
education in the public school); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 612-4 (Michie 2000) (providing
for disqualification of prospective jurors who, by reason of their physical or mental
disability, are incapable of rendering satisfactory jury service); IDAHO CODE § 33-403A
(Michie 2001) (providing that if any person, due to physical disability, is unable to access
her polling place, she may be handed a ballot outside the polling place); IOWA CODE. ANN.
§ 595.3 (West 1988) (providing that no mentally ill or retarded person may marry); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-315 (2000) (providing that no adoption association may bring a child into
the state if such child has any deformity, or is of feeble mind); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1591
(West 1990) (providing that no person who is deaf or blind may be a witness to a
testament); ME. REV. STATE. ANN. tit. 5, § 4573 (West 1989) (providing that it shall not be
unlawful employment discrimination to refuse to hire or discharge a physically or mentally
handicapped employee); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 666 (West 1988) (providing that
physically handicapped individuals may be paid at less than minimum wage); MD. CODE.
ANN. (elec.) § 3.21A (1988) (providing that a handicapped person may be assigned an
alternative polling place if her precinct is not physically accessible, but that such person
may only be assigned a new polling place if one is available); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.6
(1990) (establishing that no insane person, idiot, person who has been afflicted with syphilis
or gonorrhea, or person who has been confined in an asylum for the feeble-minded, insane,
or imbecile shall be capable of contracting marriage unless two licensed physicians confirm
that the person will not transmit such defects or disabilities to their offspring); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 449.32 (West 1989) (providing that no blind person shall operate more
than one concession stand in the city). See also Elizabeth Clark Morin, Note, Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U.L.
REv. 189, 192-94 (1990) (describing society's historical exclusion of the disabled).
116. NANCY MAIRS, WAIST HIGH IN THE WORLD 59 (1996). "Postmodern criticism...
makes a good deal of the concept of... marginality, which is meant to suggest that some
segment of the population-black, brown, yellow, or red, poor, female, lesbian, what have
you-is shouldered to the side.., by some perhaps more numerous and certainly more
powerful segment, most frequently wealthy, well-educated Euro-American males.
Regardless of the way that marginality is conceived, it is never taken to mean that those
on the margin occupy a physical space literally outside the field of vision of those in the
center, so that the latter trip unawares and fall into the laps of those they have banished
from consciousness.... 'Marginality' thus means something different for [the disabled]
from what it means to social theorists." lId
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purpose be the sole motivation for the passage of a given piece of
legislation virtually ends the possibility of having any legitimate
rational basis review.
Having concluded that, under Cleburne, the disabled are subject
only to rational basis review, the Court's "congruence" analysis
requires that the ADA's legislative record contain examples of state
conduct unconstitutional under Cleburne.' Once again, as in Boerne,
Florida Prepaid, and Kimel, the Court found the legislative record
lacking."'
However, unlike any of the previous legislation considered by
the Court, the ADA's legislative record illuminates the pervasive
unconstitutional state and private discrimination that has historically
isolated the disabled. Congress found that:
individuals with disabilities.., have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of [powerlessness] in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society."9
Congress further determined that much of this discrimination
occurs in areas subject to exclusive state control, such as education,
transportation, institutionalization, voting, and access to public
services. 2' Close congressional attention to such areas is evidence of
Congress's awareness that government action at the state level was an
essential element of the problem.' Based on numerous congressional
hearings, fact-finding reports, and testimony from over 7,000
individuals, Congress concluded that broad federal legislation like the
ADA was needed to address the continuing exclusion of the disabled
from society."
Congress determined that public and private discrimination
hindered the disableds' employment opportunities." In 1989,
117. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
118. Id
119. 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7) (1995).
120. 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3) (1995).
121. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 957-58 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
122. See Brief of Amici Curiae States at 5-15, Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
123. Id In addition to thoroughly studying state employment discrimination against
the disabled, Congress investigated the effects of state discrimination against the disabled
in other sectors. Congress determined that the failure of state institutions to make
physical accommodations for the disabled contributed to the continuing exclusion of the
disabled from mainstream society. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983). A 1980 study
reported that 76% of state owned buildings were wholly inaccessible to the physically
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Congress created the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations ("ACIR") to ascertain the impact of state action on the
continuing exclusion of the disabled from mainstream society. 4 The
Committee polled numerous state agency officials to determine why
so few disabled individuals were employed by state agencies.' 82.7%
of those polled related that "negative attitudes" / "misinformation"
about the disabled had a "strong" or "moderate" impact on their
decisions to exclude the disabled from state employment."' "Feelings
of discomfort in associating with disabled individuals" and
"inaccurate assessments of their productivity" contributed to the
continuing exclusion of disabled individuals from the public
workplace." Twenty-three of the jurisdictions polled explicitly
disabled. Id. at 38-39. A 1984 study commissioned by Congress found that the majority of
state polling places were not accessible to the disabled and only four states had enacted
laws requiring that polling booths accommodate the disabled. See 135 CONG. REC.
810793 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden) (commenting on constituent
forced to crawl into inaccessible polling place to vote). Congress found that numerous
states had been sued for refusing to allow the disabled to participate in jury pools, with
one individual suing her state after being told by a superior court judge that he would
"disqualify a deaf person [from a jury] under all circumstances." Delong v. Brumbaugh,
703 F. Supp. 399, 406 (W.D. Pa. 1989). Witnesses also described inaccessible courthouses,
courtrooms and town halls. See Americans with Disabilities Act: Joint Hearing on H.R.
4498 and S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. and the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, 101st Cong. (1988) (testimony of Sandra Parrino).
Congress also assembled substantial evidence illustrating discrimination against the
disabled in public transportation. Brief for Respondent at 24, Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240). Witnesses in wheelchairs relayed
instances of being bypassed by buses, with one witness commenting: "Its a twenty minute
ride to work, but I have to leave an hour and a half early because the buses are not
maintained ...." Id. at 25. Another witness commented, "Blacks want to ride on the
front of the bus. Disabled people just want on." Id.
Congress found that much of the state discrimination against the disabled targets
children who are repeatedly denied adequate public education because of their disabilities.
See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1990). Congress heard numerous accounts of this
discrimination, including: "a public school's refusal to admit a wheelchair-bound child
because of concern that he presented a fire hazard," another school's refusal to admit a
child with cerebral palsy because of the "nauseating effect" that his appearance would
have on other students, and a student with AIDS separated from his public school
classmates by a glass wall. Brief for Respondents at 18, Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
Although the Garrett Court's opinion only applies to Title I of the ADA, the
existence of substantial state discrimination against the disabled in so many areas should
have led the Court to question its conclusion that the states remain immune from
discriminating against the disabled in the field of employment.
124. ADv. COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, DISABILITY RIGHTS
MANDATES 64 (Comm. Print 1989).
125. Id. at 72.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 73.
admitted that they refused to hire blind applicants, and many rejected
those with a history of cancer."
In addition to numerous congressional fact-finding reports
detailing the substantial discrimination confronting disabled state
employees, a congressionally-designated Task Force held 63 public
forums across the country where it heard testimony from over 7,000
individuals. 9  Such testimony included: "a woman crippled by
arthritis [who] was denied a job, not because she couldn't do the work
but because 'college trustees thought normal students shouldn't see
her,"' a witness who applied for a job at a public library and was told
"they had already hired someone with a disability and had met their
quota," and a witness who, during a university job interview, was told
"[i]f I knew you were blind, I wouldn't have bothered bringing you in
for an interview.""3
Outside studies demonstrate that Congress was correct in
targeting employment discrimination in the ADA.13' "The poverty
rate for adults with disabilities is three times that of the rest of the
population. The explanation for the poverty is obvious: persons with
disabilities are not employed. Only thirty one percent of persons with
disabilities age 16 to 64 work part or full-time."" The absence of the
disabled from the workforce is especially troubling given the fact that
most disabled individuals want to work.'3
This history of state-sponsored discrimination against the
disabled illustrated by the ADA's legislative record presents a far
different picture from the legislative records in Boerne, Florida
Prepaid, and Kimel.134 State discrimination against the disabled has
been continual and pervasive.'35 Much of this discrimination has not
been based on legitimate state concerns, but is instead the product of
128. See 135 CONG. REC. S4984, S4988 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Jeffords). See also Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm.
on Labor & Human Res., 100th Cong. 80 (1987).
129. See TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES, FROM ADA TO EMPOWERMENT 18 (1990).
130. Brief for Respondent at 18-19, Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
131. Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 127-28 (1998).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 128.
134. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62,89 (2000).
135. Brief for Respondent at 6, Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) (No. 99-1240).
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"stereotypic[al] assumptions not truly indicative of the [ability] of
such individuals to participate in and contribute to society."36
However, despite Congress's thorough investigation of state
employment discrimination against the disabled, the Garrett Court
found the legislative record insufficient to support the extension of
Title I to the states." The Court dismissed the "half a dozen
examples" of state discrimination against the disabled documented in
the respondent's brief; stating that even if "each incident upon fuller
examination showed unconstitutional action on the part of the state,
these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the
pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation
must be based."'
In addition, the majority dismissed the three hundred examples
of state discrimination included by Justice Breyer in his dissent,
stating that these examples consisted not of "legislative findings" but
rather of "unexamined, anecdotal accounts" submitted to the Task
Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities rather than directly to Congress itself.39
Furthermore, the Court determined that Congress's
documentation of private discrimination against the disabled simply
did not translate to the states."' In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
reinforced this point, asserting that, although individuals with
disabilities face much societal prejudice, it is quite different to hold
the states in violation of the Constitution on the basis that they
embody the negative assumptions of their citizens."'
The concurrence also noted that there were very few ADA suits
brought against the states.' This absence, according to Kennedy,
proves that the states have remained immune from the discrimination
that has affected many of their citizenry.' However, the absence of
ADA employment discrimination suits against the states is hardly
conclusive evidence that such discrimination does not exist. A recent
study indicates that defendants prevail in 93% of employment cases
brought under the ADA.' Given this statistic, the absence of ADA
employment discrimination suits against the states does not justify the
136. 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7) (1995).
137. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-70. The Court conceded that the record was sufficient to
support the conclusion that private entities continued to discriminate against the disabled.
Id. at 369.
138. Id. at 369-70.
139. Id at 370-71.
140. Id. at 369.
141. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. Id at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,100 (1999).
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assumption that such suits were never brought because state
discrimination simply does not exist.
After determining that the ADA's legislative record did not
properly illustrate enough instances of state conduct failing the
rational basis test, the Court moved on to discuss whether the ADA
could, nonetheless, be considered "proportional" legislation.' 45
"Congress's power to 'enforce' the Amendment includes the
authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed
thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
text.
146
The "proportionality" inquiry requires Congress to show that its
legislation is narrowly tailored to target unconstitutional conduct.'47
After examining the obligations imposed on employers by Title I, the
Court concluded that Title I could not be sustained as "proportional"
legislation." The Court reasoned that Title I constrained much
employer conduct that would be "rational" under Cleburne"19 The
Court's conclusion that Title I is overly broad, however, ignores the
actual dictates of the statute. Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which forbids any consideration of race or national origin, the ADA
permits employers to evaluate the effect an individual's disability has
on her ability to meet job requirements."i0 The ADA targets
discrimination against qualified individuals, merely requiring that an
individual be evaluated according to her merit without taking account
of her disability. 5'
The language of Title I is narrowly tailored to assure that a
qualified individual has equal opportunity despite her disability.
First, Title I only applies to those individuals whose "physical or
mental impairment[s] ... substantially limit one or more major life
activities of such individual,' '1 2 or to those who are "regarded as
having.., an impairment."' 53  An individual who meets Title I's
145. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
146. Id. at 365 (citing Kimel v, Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536(1997)).
147. Id. at 385-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Post & Siegel, supra note 36, at 447.
148. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
149. Id.
150. See Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 24-
25, Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
151. The ADA can thus be seen as an attempt to remove the effects of societal stigma
on the employment of the disabled by legally "removing" the disability from the
employment decision.
152. 42 U.S.C. 12101(b)(2) (1995).
153. Id. In including the "regarded as" prong under Title I's disability definition,
Congress recognized that "disability" is often a social construction. Peter David Blanck,
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disability definition must then demonstrate than she is "qualified" for
the job."54
Title I defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position.""' It further states that "consideration shall be
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential."'5 6 Title I does not require an employer to hire someone
less qualified just because she has a disability.' Nor does it require
an employer to choose an employee with a disability over an equally
or more qualified person without a disability." Consequently, the
persons who benefit under this section are those who are more
qualified than all other job applicants once their disability is
"removed."'59 For example, "a waitress with a panic disorder might
not be able to perform the essential job functions of interacting with
the public and keeping [the] orders straight. If so, such an individual
might be disabled under the Act, but not a qualified individual with a
disability."' "6  Only a small number of those who meet Title I's
"disability" definition will be considered "qualified.' 6' For this
reason, many commentators have argued that the effect of Title I on
the employment of the disabled is "marginal" at best.'62
Additionally, even if an individual is a "qualified individual with
a disability," the employer is only required to make "reasonable
accommodations."' 6  An employer may refuse to accommodate a
disabled individual by showing that such accommodation would result
in "undue hardship" to the organization.'6' The ADA defines "undue
Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-
Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 882 (1997).
154. 42 U.S.C. 12111(8) (1995).
155. Id.
156. I.
157. Blanck, supra note 153, at 888; Weber, supra note 131, at 137-38.
158. Blanck, supra note 153, at 894.
159. Weber, supra note 131, at 137-38.
160. Leonard, supra note 93, at 694.
161. Id.
162. Weber, supra note 131, at 138. Weber argues that the ADA has had a minimal
effect on including the disabled in the workplace. Because many people with more serious
disabilities are not "qualified" under Title I, they are not included in its coverage. Weber
asserts that the ADA needs to be strengthened to impose affirmative obligations on
employers to hire disabled workers in order to facilitate the true inclusion of the disabled
into mainstream society. Id. at 166. The limited effectiveness of Title I is illustrated by the
fact that more than three quarters of ADA Title I charges are dismissed by the EEOC
because the plaintiff fails to illustrate that she was qualified for the job. Blanck, supra
note 151, at 900.
163. 42 U.S.C. 12111(9) (1995).
164. 42 U.S.C. 12111(10) (1995).
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hardship" broadly, allowing an employer to consider the cost of
employing the disabled individual, the resources of the organization,
and the structure of the position.1 6 Lastly, an employer is not
required to accommodate a disabled individual who would "pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of others."'66 Studies have shown
that, despite the critics of Title I who assert that it distorts the
economic marketplace, most accommodations cost little or nothing to
implement. 67  Properly viewed, therefore, Title I represents
Congress's attempt to forbid employers from relying on disability in
those situations in which disability is an inaccurate proxy for a
worker's productivity.
It is clear that the Garrett Court's construction of Title I is based
on the fundamental misconception that the "reasonable
accommodation" requirement is an affirmative action measure.
However, Congress did not intend Title I to be construed in this
manner.'6 Congress modeled the ADA after the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.169 Sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act create
affirmative obligations for federal employers receiving federal
funding, requiring them to "[s]ubmit... affirmative action program
plan[s] for the hiring, placement and advancement of individuals with
disabilities ... ,170 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, in contrast,
is a simple discrimination prohibition and does not require that an
employer take any affirmative measures, such as a quota system, to
include the disabled in the workplace.' Although Congress included
section 504's language in the ADA, it did not include the language of
sections 501 and 503.172 The conspicuous absence of this affirmative
action language from Title I illustrates that Congress did not intend to
extend the same affirmative obligations to employers under the ADA
as are mandated by the Rehabilitation Act.7
In addition, the Court's assumption that the ADA imposes
affirmative action obligations on employers is troubling given the
manner in which the ADA differs from traditional affirmative action
measures. The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals. All
165. Id.
166. 42 U.S.C. 12111(3) (1995).
167. A series of studies by Sears, Roebuck and Co. showed that the average cost of
accommodations decreased from $121 to $45 after the implementation of Title I. Blanck,
supra note 153, at 902. Blanck chronicles a number of studies illustrating that an
employer's implementation of accommodations may, in the long term, actually yield
economic returns for him. Id. at 912-14.
168. Weber, supra note 131, at 152.
169. Id. at 150.
170. 29 U.S.C. 791(b).
171. Id-
172. Weber, supra note 131, at 152.
173. Id.
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it requires is that an individual's abilities be taken into account before
her disabilities. Therefore, the ADA promotes equal rights, not
special rights.174  In contrast, the traditional affirmative action
program involves set-asides or quotas, advancing an individual based
on her group affiliation rather than her qualifications. The Supreme
Court has long abandoned the group rights approach of the Equal
protection clause implemented in Brown v. Board of Education. In
exchange, the Court has held that the Equal Protection clause targets
individuals and mandates that the government treat each person
equally despite some perceived negative group affiliation.7 6 Title I,
targeting qualified individuals, is fully compliant with this narrow
reading of the Equal Protection clause.
The Garrett Court's assumption that the ADA imposes
affirmative obligations on employers can be seen in its discussion of
Title I's prohibition of the use of "standards, criteria, or methods of
administration" that disparately impact the disabled."7 Referring to
Washington v. Davis ("Davis"), the Garrett Court stated: "Our cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose,
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.,,1S
The Court's reference to Davis is misleading in two respects.
First, Davis was based on the Court's recognition of its own
institutional incompetence.'79 The Davis plaintiffs asked the Court to
apply strict scrutiny to invalidate a police officer admissions test that
was neutral on its face and not motivated by any discriminatory
intent." ° The Court refused to do so even though, in its application,
far more blacks failed the test than whites."1 The Court explained
that:
a rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and
174. Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564 (1998) (discussing courts' willingness to equate the equal
rights provided by antidiscrimination law with "special" rights).
175. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
176. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[T]he Constitution
protect[s] persons, not groups. It follows from that principle that all government actions
based on race ... should be subject to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.")
177. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
178. Id at 373 (citing to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
179. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48.
180. Id at 232-33.
181. Id. at 24546.
would raise serious questions, and perhaps invalidate a whole range
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes."2
Understandably, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny
because of the substantial judicial intervention that such heightened
review entails." Instead, the Court opined that the Legislature
should assume responsibility for extending the disparate impact
standard to those areas where it is not currently statutorily
authorized."8
As with its Cleburne discussion, the Garrett Court's discussion of
Davis wholly ignores the reason that the Davis Court refused to apply
strict scrutiny to neutral tests with disparate racial impacts. 5 It is
clear, as the Davis Court pointed out, that the application of strict
scrutiny requires substantial judicial intervention in neutral legislative
policies; greatly intruding upon the separation of powers between the
judicial and legislative branches. The intrusive effect of strict scrutiny
caused the Davis Court to insist that the extension of the disparate
impact standard come from legislation rather than from the Equal
Protection clause.' Congress's adoption of the disparate impact
standard in Title I is fully compliant, therefore, with the Davis Court's
reasoning."
In addition, Davis' decision to subject facially neutral tests
having a disparate impact on racial minorities to rational basis review
does not translate to the ADA with the ease that the Garrett majority
assumes it does. The type of test challenged in Davis, despite having
a disparate impact on minorities, was administered in an even-handed
manner. Each police applicant took the same test and was subject to
the same screening criteria. There is nothing inherent in one's status
as a racial minority that makes one less competent to take a neutral
admissions test created and administered without a discriminatory
motive.
For disabled individuals, however, the situation may be quite
different. For example, a blind applicant who is extremely well
qualified for a particular job should not be "screened out" because he
is unable to read the employment test. For this applicant, unlike
those in Davis, the employment test is inherently discriminatory and
182. Id at 248.
183. Id. at 245-46.
184. Id. at 248.
185. Id.
186. The Garrett Court, in a statement that, given its extremely narrow view of
Congress's § 5 powers, seems wholly gratuitous, took note of Congress's power to prohibit
neutral policies having a disparate impact on the disabled when it stated: "If special
accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law
and not through the Equal Protection Clause." Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
187. Id. at 385-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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does not, in any way, measure the blind applicant's ability to do the
job. Rather, the test screens out the individual because of his
disability. The Equal Protection clause guarantees that an individual
be judged based upon her capabilities rather than her membership in
a certain disfavored group. Title I's prohibition on the use of tests
that tend to screen out the disabled furthers this guarantee by
"removing" the consideration of disability from the employment
inquiry.
Moreover, conceding for the sake of argument that Title I
represents an affirmative action measure, the Court departs from its
own recent precedent regarding the degree of scrutiny that should be
applied to "benign" affirmative action measures. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson ("Croson") and, later, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena ("Adarand"), the Court held that all race-
based government classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.
88
Although the Croson Court indicated that congressional legislation
benefiting racial minorities was subject to a different standard than
parallel state legislation given Congress's "broad remedial powers"
under section 5, the Court repudiated this finding seven years later in
Adarand. Under Croson and Adarand, the Court will apply the
same level of scrutiny to measures that advantage certain groups as to
those measures that disadvantage them. As indicated by this
framework, legislation benefiting racial minorities is subject to strict
scrutiny while legislation benefiting individuals with disabilities is
subject to rational basis review.1" Lower courts have followed
Adarand's framework in applying rational basis review to
188. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989). The precise
reasoning of the these opinions is beyond the scope of this Note.
189. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91. The Court stated "Congress, unlike any state or
political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The power to "enforce" may at times also include the power to
define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt
prophylactic rules to deal with these situations." Id. at 490. The Court ignored Croson's
discussion of Congress's powers when it held that all race-based government classifications
must survive strict scrutiny. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
[T]he Court will apply 'intermediate scrutiny' to cases of invidious gender
discrimination and 'strict scrutiny' to cases of invidious race discrimination, while
applying the same standard for benign classifications as for invidious ones...
[T]oday's lecture about 'consistency' will produce the anomalous result that the
Government can more easily enact affirmative-action programs to remedy
discrimination against women than it can enact affirmative-action programs to
remedy discrimination against African Americans.
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classifications benefiting the disabled, while subjecting classifications
benefiting women or racial minorities to higher standards.'
Thus, under Adarand, affirmative action programs benefiting the
disabled should be subject to the lowest level of review. While
Adarand's logic has been heavily debated, it is currently the law.
However, the Garrett Court failed to mention Adarand. Had the
Court followed its own recent precedent, Title I would have been
unquestionably upheld under the rational basis standard. Yet, by
striking down Title I, the Court has established that legislation
designed to benefit the disabled is subject to strict scrutiny while




The primary problem with the Garrett majority opinion is its lack
of deference to Congress. The history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the precedent established by the Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach clearly illustrate that the Fourteenth Amendment greatly
expanded the powers of Congress to remedy potentially
unconstitutional state action. The Garrett Court ignored this
historical and legal precedent. In addition, Garrett, in combination
with Boerne, Florida Prepaid, and Kimel, strongly suggest that
Congress's section 5 power is limited to remedying violations already
deemed unconstitutional by the Court.' This gives Congress little
leeway to act on behalf of groups, like the disabled, that the Court has
deemed non-suspect.' 94
The Court's "congruence and proportionality" test saps Congress
of its strength to legislate in response to "evolving and contested
societal norms."' 9  Congress has been at the forefront of
incorporating changing societal norms into the judiciary's
understanding of the Equal Protection clause. 6 For example, the
Court's recognition that gender classifications required intermediate
scrutiny did not occur until Congress had legislated to improve the
191. Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action
and the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REv. 281, 301-
307 (1997) (describing cases applying three different tiers of review to affirmative action
programs benefiting racial minorities, women, and people with disabilities).
192. "[I]t is difficult to understand why the Court, which applies 'minimum rational-
basis review' to statutes that burden persons with disabilities ... subjects to far stricter
scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those same individuals." Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,387-88 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193. Leonard, supra note 93, at 653.
194. Post and Siegel, supra note 36, at 461.
195. Id. at 446.
196. See id. at 518-19.
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position of women in society." Judicial restraint impedes the Court's
ability to address all possible state action that threatens the
Constitution's promise of equality, leaving an "enforcement gap" for
Congress to fill."1 The Court recognized this "enforcement gap" in
Washington v. Davis when it explained that the extension of the
disparate impact standard should await legislative prescription.'"
The Court's recent jurisprudence greatly threatens Congress's
ability to change illogical prejudices through national legislation. The
Court's finding in Garrett that state action discriminating against the
disabled is only subject to rational basis review by the courts should
not have any bearing on whether Congress can react to such
conduct.' °  Rational basis review reflects the judiciary's
understanding that it does not possess the institutional competence to
review certain legislative classifications. 0  No "rule of restraint
applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises it §5 power.
Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process.., have
no application to Congress.' The traditional understanding of
Congress's section 5 powers recognized this institutional difference
between Congress and the Courts.
The close judicial scrutiny accompanying the "congruence" and
"proportionality" test raises serious separation of powers problems.2
Congress's place in the constitutional scheme rests on its institutional
fact-finding capacity that places it in the unique position to determine
when and what laws are needed.25 In contrast, the judiciary has no
such institutional competence?" Rather, the judiciary's strength is
derived from its isolation from popular sentiment. Judgments about
the necessity of a given piece of legislation are "inherently value-
laden, and thus inevitably political."2 7  Therefore, to place the
197. See id.
198. Id. at 467.
199. Id. at 469.
200. Id. at 467.
201. ld.
202. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing to Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,248 (1970)).
203. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
204. "At its core, this is a separation-of-powers revolution, one that happens to be
playing out now on the field of states' fights but is not likely to stay confined to that
battleground.... [This separation of powers rationale] was less evident in earlier cases
that found the court confronting statutes that could be described as the result of legislative
sloppiness, inattention, or grandstanding." Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target:
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001.
205. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 328,384 (2001).
206. Id at391.
207. Id. at 392.
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judiciary in the position of evaluating the wisdom and necessity of
congressional enactments makes little sense.
203
Furthermore, the Court's assumption that the legislative record
reflects everything that Congress relied on in passing a given law is
simply incorrect. Often when Congress acts in a given area, it brings
with it knowledge and expertise derived from the passage of other
laws in this same area.2' This outside knowledge is especially
relevant in the field of disability discrimination in which Congress had
legislated repeatedly before passing the ADA. "This reality of
Congressional procedures conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent
willingness to infer from silence in the legislative process that a
problem that Congress identifies as significant does not warrant a
federal response."
Finally, Garrett's holding that states are immune from Title I
damages suits increases the obligation of the federal government to
patrol these discrimination claims. "[F]ederal antidiscrimination law
that cannot be sustained as an exercise of section 5 power will
probably be enforced against the states primarily through the
cumbersome and unwieldy intervention of federal agencies. The
limited power of the federal government to pursue each claim of
discrimination under the ADA will greatly reduce the power of
litigants to pursue these claims in a federal forum.212 Although the
Eleventh Amendment does not limit private injunctive suits against
the states, "the availability of monetary relief is critical to fashioning a
complete remedy for disability discrimination.,
213
Moreover, although private litigants may still enforce Title I
claims in state court, it is not clear that state courts provide the same
208. Id
209. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980) ("The creation of national rules
for the governance of our society simply does not entail the same concept of recordmaking
that is appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress has no
responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular parties.
Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to investigate
and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an issue. One
appropriate source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires in the
consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. After Congress has repeatedly
legislated in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers action in that
area.")
210. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 205, at 387.
211. Post & Seigel, supra note 36, at 451.
212. Leonard, supra note 93, at 665.
213. Id. at 652. "[A] plaintiff cannot be made whole by an order against a state agency
to desist from a discriminatory practice. Plaintiffs may incur actual, retrospective losses
such as a loss of program benefits, lost wages, or out of pocket expenses. The only way to
address these injuries is through a monetary award." Id
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opportunities that a federal forum does.214 The states' preference to
litigate claims against them in their own courts highlights the fact that
a state court may not provide an adequate remedy for private ADA
claimants.25  State judges may be unwilling to embrace ADA
plaintiffs as they realize that any damage award will be paid out of the
state's treasury.2 16  This potential bias makes a federal forum
necessary.2
214. Id at 658.
215. ld
216. See id
217. It

